Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 6

11-1-1986

Turn Out the Lights, the Party's Over: An Economic Analysis of
Kelly V. Gwinnell
Charles G. Popp

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Charles G. Popp, Note, Turn Out the Lights, the Party's Over: An Economic Analysis of Kelly V. Gwinnell, 6
N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 129 (1986).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

NOTES

Turn Out the Lights; The Party's Over:
An Economic Analysis of Social
Host Liability
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the American public has reacted with increasing outrage
at the destruction of life and property caused by drunk drivers.' Over
fifty percent of all traffic deaths and over 670,000 serious traffic injuries each year are caused by intoxicated drivers.2 Both the federal

and state governments are responding to these losses by taking steps
to discourage drinking and driving.3

The intoxicated motorist" is usually held liable for injuries proximately caused by his drunk driving; also, many states have enacted
I. The public demand for action against drunk driving is evidenced by the
establishment of a presidential commission on drunk driving and the enactment of
Public Law 97-134, which provided federal grants to "those states which adopt and
implement effective programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting from persons driving while under the influence of alcohol . . ." 96 Stat. 1738 (1982) (current

version at 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1985)). See The New Hope of Solution, Presidential
Commission on Drunk Driving (1983): Measures to Combat Drunk Driving: Hearings on S. 98-917 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Measures to Combat Drunk Driving].
2. Measures to Combat Drunk Driving, supra note 1, at I (statement of Senator
John C. Danforth, subcommittee chairman). See also Drinking and Driving, 65
METRO. LIFE INS. CO. STAT. BULL. 2 (1984).
3. Measures to Combat Drunk Driving, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of the
American Insurance Association); Winter, States Get Tougher on Drunk Drivers,
68 A.B.A.J. 140 (1982).
4. Intoxication has been defined as "an individual does not have the normal
use of his physical or mental faculties, thus rendering him incapable of acting in
the manner in which an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, in full possession of
his faculties, using reasonable care, would act under like conditions." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 738 (5th ed. 1979).
The standard of care required of an intoxicated person is that of a reasonably
prudent sober person. Scott v. Gardner, 137 Tex. 628, 156 S.W.2d 513, 518 (1941);
Annot., 141 A.L.R. 50 (1942). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977).
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liquor control statutes, typically known as "dram shop acts," which

extend liability to the commercial vendor who supplied the liquor.,
Until recently, common law liability was not imposed on the non-

commercial provider.'

Two reasons have customarily been given for the refusal to im-

pose liability. First, at common law, it was believed that the drinking

of the alcohol, not the serving, was the proximate cause of intoxication;

The proximate cause of an injury has been defined as a "reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 178 (5th
ed. 1984); Accord Millette v. Rodosta, 84 I11. App. 3d 5, 404 N.E.2d 832 (1904);
Strobeck v. Bren, 93 Minn. 428, 101 N.W. 795 (1904); See generally Parnell, Causation, 30 Wis. BAR BULL. 17 (Feb. 1957).
5. A typical example is the Illinois Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 135 (1983), which reads in part: "Every person who is injured in person or property by an intoxicated person, has a right of action in his or her own name, severally
or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the
intoxication of such person."
The Illinois act has remained almost unchanged since its enactment in 1872.
See Olgilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 ILL. L.F. 175.
It has been reported that twenty-three states have dram shop acts. See 4D
Personal Injury Intoxicated Persons § 102 (1971).
Recovery under the common law is significant since most liquor control acts
limit the amount of recovery. Illinois' limit is $30,000 for personal injury and property damage and $40,000 for wrongful death. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983),
as amended, Act of Sept. 12, 1985, Pub. Act 84-271 (1985).
6. Articles on this subject include: Graham, Liability of Social Host for Injuries
Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETTE L.J. 561 (1980)
(calling for social host liability to be codified); Reskin, Social Hosts Liable in Two
States for Serving-Drinks, 71 A.B.A.J. 94 (July 1985); Stanner, Liability of Social
Host for Off Premise Negligence of Inebriated Guest, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980) (examining an Illinois' trial court decision imposing liability); Comment, The Liability
of Social Hosts for Their Intoxicated Guests' Automobile Accidents-An Extension
of the Law, 18 AKRON L. REV. 473 (1985); Comment, Employer Liability for a
Drunken Employee's Actions Following an Office Party: A Cause of Action Under
Respondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 107 (1982); Note, Social Host Liability
for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L. REV. 445 (1983)
(social'host liability should be flatly imposed); Comment, Social Host Liability for
Furnishing Alcohol: A Legal Hangover? 10 PAC. L.J. 95 (1979) (liability of social
host should only be a secondary liability, after the drunk driver); 'Comment, Social
Host Liability and Missouri Tort Law, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 509 (1985); Comment,
Recognizing the Liability of Social Hosts Who Knowingly Allow Intoxicated Guests
to Drive: Limits to Socially Acceptable Behavior, 60 WASH. L. REV. 389 (1985);
Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers and Social Hosts for the
Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1013 (1983) (social host liability
may be found dependent on facts); Comment, Liability of a Social Host, 48 NOTRE
DAME L. REV.

709 (1973).
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thus the provider had committed no wrong. 7 Secondly, great deference
has been given to the state legislatures. Courts reasoned that since
legislatures specifically placed liability on commercial providers their

intent was to exclude non-commercial providers from liability.8 This
explanation seems misplaced in light of the fact that over sixty-one
percent of alcohol is purchased for off-premise consumption than for

all other purposes. 9
Despite deference to legislatures and the limited coverage of dram
shop acts, social host liability for the acts of intoxicated guests is

not a novel concept, dating as far back as the 1800's."° The actual
imposition of liability, nevertheless, is a relatively new development.
Courts in Oregon and California first extended liability;" however,
the legislatures in those states abrogated each respective court ruling.' 2

App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981) ("drink7. See Miller v. Moran, 96 111.
ing not the selling, is the proximate cause"); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (conduct of the consumer, not supplier).
App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983) ("only
8. See Heldt v. Brei, 118 111.
remedy is that provided by the dram shop"); Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593
(Minn. 1982) ("legislative intent to restrict to commercial vendors is sufficiently clear").
9. In 1983, alcohol purchased for off-premise consumption totaled $31,969
million whereas all other purchases of alcoholic beverages equaled $19,445 million.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Survey of Current Business, July 1984.
10. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Il1. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (action by wife against
friend who served husband two drinks. He was subsequently thrown from his horse
which resulted in his death; however there was no finding of social host liability).
II. See, e.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). (cause of action existed against host fraternity,
which should have known minor guest was also driving); Coulter v. Superior Court
of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 577.P.2d 669 (1978)
(social host liable for serving obviously intoxicated adult);.Congini v. Portersville
Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (social host liable for serving alcohol
to a minor). But see Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983) (social
host not liable for serving alcohol to an intoxicated adult).
An interesting report of an Illinois trial court decision on social host liability
may be found in Stanner, Liability of a Social Host for Off Premises Negligence
on Inebriated Guest, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980). The case involved a teenage basement
party which took place while the parents were upstairs. The teenage host and one
of the guests left the party and were both killed in a head-on collision. A jury verdict of $90,000 was rendered against the estate of the teenage host but the parents
were found not guilty on grounds of insufficient knowledge of the activities. The
judgment was not appealed.
12. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b),(c) (West 1985).
This turn of events appears to also have taken place in Minnesota. Initially
liability was imposed on the social host in Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d
149 (1972) but was abrogated by the legislature in MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1977).
For a history, see Cole v. City of Spring Lake, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982).
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The New Jersey case of Kelly v. Gwinnell'3 appears to be the
first case to withstand the traditional objections and maintain social
host liability. Courts in Iowa"' and Indiana" have followed New Jersey
and imposed liability for serving an intoxicated adult while four other
states impose liability for serving minors. 6
This comment will review the reasoning set forth in Kelly" and
subsequent decisions and place them in a framework of economic
analysis. In particular, the policy considerations of imposing a duty
will be discussed as well as the issue of who should impose it. Also,
the evidentiary problems of holding a provider of alcohol liable will
be analyzed. This article will conclude with an analysis which will
suggest that the common law bar against imposing liability on a social
host who serves liquor is no longer appropriate.
II.

HISTORY

The liability of a social host for the negligent acts of his guests
is analogous to the liability of the commercial dispenser of liquor.'"
However, in several states that have enacted liquor control acts or
dram shop acts, the statute may be a bar to recovery against the host.' 9
To establish a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant owed him a duty of care.20 This duty
is established by the creation of a special relationship between the
two parties. 2 ' The relationship arises because the defendant's conduct
13. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). For a summary of the facts see infra
note 50.
14. Clark v. Mincks,
Iowa __,
364 N.W.2d 226 (1985).
15. Ashlock v. Norris,
- Ind. __,
475 N.E.2d 1167 (1985).
16. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Walker v. Key,
101 N.M. 631, 686 P.2d 973 (1984); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157,
470 A.2d 515 (1983); Koback v. Crook, __
Wis. 2d __
, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).

17. Besides creating a precedent for courts to follow, Kelly has also spawned
considerable commentary: Note, Social Host's Liability: No More "One for the Road"
in New Jersey, 61 CHI. KENT L. REV. 165 (1985); Note, Social Host Liability Under
the Common Law: Kelly v. Gwinnell, 1985 DET. C. L. REV. 97 (1985); Note TortsNegligence, Kelly v. Gwinnell, 89 DICK. L. REV. 537 (1985); Comment, Kelly v.
Gwinnell The Social Host and His Visibly Intoxicated Guests: Joint Liability for
Injuries to Third Parties and Proper Evidentiary Tests, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
191 (1984); Comment, Imposing Third Party Liability on Social Hosts, 5 PACE L.
80-89 (1985).

REV.

18.
19.
20.
21.
162 N.E.

Graham, supra note 6, at 563.
See infra text accompanying notes 70-75.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 30 at 164.
Id. at 285 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339,
99 (1928)).
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created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm that a reasonable
and prudent person would have taken steps to avoid." This standard
of conduct may also be prescribed by statute.2 3
In order for actionable negligence to be established by legislative
enactment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a member of
the class of people the legislature intended to protect." Furthermore,
the harm suffered by the plaintiff must be the type which the statute
intended to prevent. 5 Thus, in theory, if a person is injured by a
social host's intoxicated guest, liability may be imposed under a statute
prohibiting the giving of liquor to an intoxicated adult. However, this
result is unlikely under the dram shop acts.
In Illinois, for example, the dram shop act has been in existence
since the late 1800's.26 As will be shown, several assaults have been
made against social hosts under the broadly-worded act, but each attack
has failed.
Courts reason that dram shop coverage should apply only to those
in the business of selling liquor; thus the social host is not included
within the ambit of the act.27 The stated purpose of the Illinois act
is to promote "sound and careful control and regulation of the
manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors." ' 8 This has
been construed to limit the statute to the commercial providers of
liquor.29 Furthermore, the spirit of the act was stated to be of a penal,
22. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, § 31 at 170.
23. Id. at 220.
24. Id. at 224.
25. Id. at 225.
26. See supra note 5.
On the other hand, some states have not adopted dram shop liability until
recently. For example, New Jersey established the liability in 1959. See Rappaport
v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
27. Camille v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc., 30 111. App. 3d 1050, 334 N.E.2d 205
(1975) (not applicable to anyone who is not directly or indirectly involved in liquor
traffic); See also Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 11. App.2d 412, 199 N.E.2d
300 (1964); Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, Am. Legion, 11 Ohio
St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521 (1984) (requiring a sale for the statute to apply).
28. Camille, 30 Il. App. 3d at 1052, 334 N.E.2d at 207 quoting Graham v.
General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d 856 (1968).
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 (1874) ("An act to provide for the licensing of and against
the evils arising from the sale of intoxicating liquors.").
29. Camille, 30 11. App. 3d at 1052, 334 N.E.2d at 207; Settlemyer, 464 N.E.2d
at 524; accord, Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super 525, 298 A.2d
84, 88 (1972) ("To hold business enterprise liable for the actions of drunken guests
at their social affairs leads into extremely difficult questions of deciding what is
business and what is social.").
Retailer may be defined as a "person who sells, or offers for sale, alcoholic
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rather than remedial, nature. 3" In this manner, part of the cost of
doing business as a dram shop is the potential liability for the negligent
acts of patrons. 3 ' Thus, courts conclude that social hosts are not within
the class of people the legislature intended to hold liable.32 In the
Illinois case of Heldt v. Brei,33 the defendants allowed their son to
throw a party and collect money from the guests to buy liquor.3 '
A guest became intoxicated, and after leaving the party in his automobile, injured the plaintiff." The Illinois appellate court reasoned
that the defendants were not in the business of selling liquor and
therefore were outside the scope of the act.36
Dram shop acts have been utilized to deny liability in other circumstances as well.3" Included are instances where an employer serves
liquor for use or consumption and not for resale in any form." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 43, 95.17 (1983).
30. Miller, 48 Ill.
App. at 420, 199 N.E.2d at 305 ("being penal in character
it .[the statute] must be strictly construed").
31. This depends on a concept economists call the elasticity of demand. Elasticity
is an index measuring the proportionate change in the quantity consumers desire to
purchase from a proportionate change in price. An inelastic good is a product which
finds a price increase bringing about a proportionately smaller decrease in consumption, thereby increasing the seller's total revenue. A price increase of an elastic good,
on the other hand, results in a proportionately greater decrease in consumption and
thus a fall in the seller's total revenue. Hence, the retail liquor provider passes these
costs on if liquor is an inelastic good but absorbs the cost if it is elastic.
In Simon, The Price Elasticity of Liquor in the U.S. and a Simple Method
of Determination, 34 ECONOMETRICA 193 (1966), the median level price elasticity in
Illinois was found to be an absolute value, approximately 1.88, while Iowa was found
to be 1.58. This indicates a 1 percent increase in price will decrease consumption
by 1.88 percent and 1.58 percent respectively. Assuming the figures reflect the demand
for dram shop services, they indicate that in Illinois and Iowa the expected cost
of dram shop liability is not totally passed on to patrons. When the dram shop
raises prices to cover this expense, total revenue falls. Thus it is forced to bear a
large portion of liability. Accord Driver, Price Elasticity by Quasi-experiment, I1
App. EcON. 147 (1979). For a general discussion on price elasticity see POSNER, infra
note 56, at 196-97.
32. Heldt, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 801, 455 N.E.2d at 844 (no special relationship);
Cole v. City of Spring Lake, 314 N.W.2d 836, 839 (Minn. 1982) ("Civil Damages
Act provides the exclusive remedy for sale of intoxicating liquor by an in-state
vendor"); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So.2d 526 (Miss. 1985) (Mississippi Local Option Alcoholic Control Law applies only to holders of permits).
33. 118 I1. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
34. Id. at 799, 455 N.E.2d at 843.
35. Id. at 799-800, 455 N.E.2d at 843.
36. See supra cases cited at note 32.
37. Courts, however, have not willingly yielded to a negligent entrustment theory.
See Congini, 470 A.2d at 519 (negligent entrustment of car denied because social
host did not own the car the intoxicated motorist was driving); Heldt, 118 Il1. App.
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liquor to his employees3" and where a business provides alcohol for
the entertainment of its clients. 9 Also, dram shop acts have been found
to be inapplicable when the intoxicated guest injures himself. 0
Recently, however, dram shop acts have been found to apply
to those who provide liquor to a minor. 4 ' For example, in Sutter v.

Hutchings, 2 the Georgia Supreme Court determined that social hosts
owed a duty to highway users to refrain from serving alcohol to a
minor.4 3 The case involved a fatal automobile accident caused by a
teenage guest at a high school party." The court relied on two Georgia
misdemeanor statutes prohibiting the sale or providing of liquor to
a noticeably intoxicated person or to a minor.45
Imposing liability on hosts for the injuries caused by the host's
intoxicated minor guests establishes the framework for common law
liability. Generally, these decisions rely on the assumption that a minor
is unable to handle the effects of liquor.4" This is evidenced by statutes
and regulations prohibiting the sale to or purchase of alcohol by
3d at 802, 455 N.E.2d at 845 (negligent entrustment of house to intoxicated guest
denied because house is not a dangerous item in the hands of an intoxicated).
38. Miller, 48 111.App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964) (employee picnic); Edgar
v. Kajet, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976) (company party); Meany v. Newell,
367 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1985) (office Christmas party).
39. Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Christmas party); Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp. 460 F. Supp. 80, 81-2 (D.C. 1978)
(after tavern closing get-together of employees); Camille, 30 Il. App. 3d 1050, 344
N.E.2d 205 (1975) (corporate chicken fry); Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn.
1982) (golf outing).
40. Shuman v. Mashburn, 137 Ga. App. 231, 223 S.E.2d 268 (1976) (dove
into five foot deep pool); Zamiar v. Linderman, 132 Ill. App. 3d 886, 478 N.E.2d
534 (1985) (minor tripped on rug); Klotz v. Persenaire, 138 Mich. Ct. App. 638,
360 N.W.2d 255 (1985) (minor jumped from power boat).
41. See, e.g., Brittain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974)
(statute prohibiting giving alcohol to a minor, negligence per se); Walker, 686 P.2d
at 976 (the statute was intended to protect the general public from "the risks of
injury caused by intoxicated minors." Id. This construed N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-78-1.1
(1985) which reads in part that it is a violation "to sell, serve, or give any alcoholic
liquor to a minor or to permit a minor to consume alcoholic liquor on the licensed
premises"). See also Giardina v. Soloman, 360 F. Supp., 262-63 (M.D. Pa. 1973)
(fraternity could be liable for injuries inflicted on another guest by an intoxicated
minor served liquor at a fraternity party).
42. 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d at 716 (1985).
43. Id. at 719.
44. Id. at 717.
45. Id. at 719.
46. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517; See also Weiner, 485 P.2d at 21 ("by virtue
of youth alone . . . [minors could be expected] to behave in a dangerous fashion
under the influence of alcohol").
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minors. 7 Thus, a distinction is made from the common law view that
it is not a tort to provide alcohol to an able bodied adult; minors

apparently are considered to possess different qualities." 8
The rationale supporting common law liability for the negligent
acts of an intoxicated minor guest, however, could also apply to
adults." The facts of the cases wherein social host liability was imposed
for serving an intoxicated minor justified extending liability for the
acts of intoxicated adults."0 Furthermore, Kelly explicitly recognized
that time had elapsed since the earlier holdings and that the legislature
47. See supra cases cited at note 39.
48. Lynn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976) (host who serves
alcoholic drinks to a visibly intoxicated minor with knowledge the minor was about
to drive could reasonably foresee an automobile accident).
49. This approach was followed in Figuly v. Knoll, 195 N.J. Super. 477, 449
A.2d 564 (1982) (summary judgment favoring social host who served visibly intoxicated guest at his party denied).
50. The facts of Kelly indicate that the intoxicated guest had two drinks at
the host's home after work. Within twenty-five minutes of leaving the house, the
motorist collided with the plaintiff's automobile. The guest's blood alcohol concentration was .286 percent while at .10 percent a person is legally drunk. See Kelly,
476 A.2d at 1220. The court ruled:
[A] host who serves liquor to an adult social guest knowing both that the
guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable
for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by
the intoxication.
Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1224. The court further ruled the intoxicated motorist and host
were joint tortfeasors. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1230.
In Ashlock, the host was a patron at a bar and had bought drinks for his
female motorist friend. She fell down while walking to her car and the host attempted
to dissuade her from driving but failed. Shortly thereafter, she hit a jogger on the
side of the road while passing another car. The court relied on IND. CODE § 7.1-5-10-15
(1978) which makes it a crime for "a person to sell, barter, deliver, or give away
an alcoholic beverage to another person who is in a state of intoxication if the person knows that the other person is intoxicated." Ashlock, 475 N.E.2d at 1169.
Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (1985) involved an afternoon cookout that
lasted late into the night. The guest drank over 10 beers, spilled beer and had difficulty standing. She took several children in her van to town to play video games.
On the way, she overturned the van killing two of the children. Her blood alcohol
concentration was .222 percent. Id. at 228. The court based its holding on IOWA
CODE § 123.49(1) (1984), which makes the giving of alcohol to any intoxicated person a misdemeanor. This allowed the court to circumvent legislative action allowing
civil recovery only against licensees and permittees. Id. at 231. Compare IowA CODE
§ 123.92 (1971) (repealed and superseded by 1971 House File No. 172) ("shall have
a right of action ... against any licensee or permittee. . ."). See also MINN. STAT.
§ 340.95 (1972) (right of action against any person who, by selling, bartering or
giving intoxicating liquors); MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1977) (right of action against
any person who by selling or bartering intoxication liquors). Since this change
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had ample opportunity to abrogate the rules."' Because the legislature

had not acted, the court took the opportunity to review and analyze
the liability of the social host.
III.
A.

ECONOMIC

ASPECTS OF IMPOSING THE DUTY:

RECOGNITION OF THE COSTS

The decision to impose a duty on the social host is a determina-

tion which will force the host to consider the potential costs to the
victimized motorist and subsequently, himself, if he chooses to serve
an intoxicated driver additional alcohol.5 2 Historically, these costs have
been borne by the intoxicated individual.5 3 However, if the tortfeasor
is insolvent, and the social host liability theory is not recognized, the

entire cost is borne by the victim." ' The stated goal of the Kelly
majority was to prevent this inequitable and unfortunate occurrence."
When an individual engages in activities which impose a cost on
other members of society, and that cost is not taken into consideration by the actor when selecting the activity, an externality is created.5 6
The effect of creating a special relationship between the social host
and the injured plaintiff for the negligent acts of intoxicated guests

internalizes the external costs associated with serving additional drinks."

Minnesota courts refuse to impose liability on the social host, as it once did in Ross
v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). For a history see Cady, 315 N.W.2d
at 593.
51. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1226 ("no adverse reaction on the part of the legislature"); Ashlock, 475 N.E.2d at 1169 ("legislature has had ample time to respond
52.
53.
54.
55.

476 A.2d at 1226.
1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
1224.
1226.
56. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 51-52 (1977); Courts have
utilized this concept as well. See for example the traffic congestion problem from
the construction of new apartment buildings in South East Lake View Neighbors
v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 685 F.2d 1027, 1037 n.7 (7th Cir.
1982) ("externalities produced by the investor's actions are not too remote to support an injured party's standing to sue").
57. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 2 (1960)
("The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm to B and
what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are
dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict
harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: Should A be allowed to
harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?") A general discussion of basic economic
principals utilized by courts may be found in Skipworth, Economic Analysis for
Attorneys, 71 ILL. B. J. 372 (1983).
Kelly,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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The decision to impose this duty rests upon whether the lost freedom
of camaraderie and entertainment is greater or less than the need to
compensate victims."5
1. Legislative versus Judicial Action
The court in Kelly stated that the strong public concern over drunk
driving, coupled with the magnitude of the losses being sustained by
society, weighed heavily in favor of creating a duty for social hosts."
The court also acknowledged trends in public awareness and private
restraints against drunk drivers."' Furthermore, the host's homeowner's
insurance would allow members of society to spread the costs of the
6
newly found liability. '

The dissent in Kelly pointed out that, unlike the commercial provider, the social host has no means of absorbing the cost of a judgment against him. 62 The insurance premiums of the dram shop are,
however, at least in a small part, passed on to the patrons in the
form of higher drink prices.63 Correspondingly, in the social host con58. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1224.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1227.
61. Id. at 1225 n.9; accord Koback v. Crook, - Wis. 2d __, 366 N.W.2d
857-61 (1985).
A sample homeowners policy reads in the pertinent part:
Exclusions:
(h) to bodily injury or property damage for which the insured or his indemnitee may be held liable
(1) as a person or organization engaged in the business of manufacturing,
distributing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages, or
(2) if not so engaged, as an owner or lessor of premises used for such purposes, if such liability is imposed . . . (ii) by reason of the selling, serving
or giving of any alcoholic beverage to a minor or to a person under the
influence of alcohol or which causes or contributes to the intoxication of
any person;
but part (ii) of this exclusion does not apply with respect to liability of
the insured or his indemnitee as an owner or lessor described in (2) above
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., ANNOTATED, Owners' Landlords' and
Tenants' Liability Insurance, Specimen Form (1984).
Furthermore, contribution between the intoxicated motorist and the host may
be allowed by analogy to the dram shop. Morgan v. Kirk Bros., Inc., Ill IIll. App.
3d 914, 919, 444 N.E.2d 504, 508 (1983) ("Thus, contribution is not prevented by
the fact that, in this case, the motorist and the dram shops are subject to a common
liability to an injured party resting on different theories rather than a common standard of wrongdoing").
62. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
63. Id. Contra Simon, supra note 31, at 199.
THE
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text the true spreading of the costs from the injured victims to the
rest of society will be in overall higher home insurance premiums.64
The object of the rule then becomes not to prevent social drinking and its after effects, but to insure against any harmful consequences.65 Although a certain amount of reduction in the traditional
modes of entertainment such as parties and celebrations will take place,
the court predicted a negligible impact on such activities."
The Kelly dissent, although acknowledging a need for a remedy,
stated that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, should address
the problem and provide the remedy6 7 due to the far-reaching impact
on the average citizen. 8
One difficulty with a legislative response to this problem is that
statutes are often vague in establishing the appropriate standards of
conduct. 69 This point is illustrated when dram shop acts are utilized
to create the special relationship between host and victim. The wording
of a statute does not guarantee that the plaintiff and his injuries will
fall within the categories created by the legislature. For example, the
Illinois statute states that one injured by an intoxicated person has
a cause of action against "any person'
who caused the intoxication.
The wording of the statute, however, has been deemed to apply only
to those in the business of selling liquor. 7 On the other hand, the
Iowa statute, creating a tort cause of action for the injured individual,
limits recovery to one who is a licensee or permitee. 7" Yet, the effect
of this Iowa statute was circumvented through another section of the
same act which made it a misdemeanor to give liquor to an intoxicated person. 3 Limiting recovery to licensees and permitees was found
not to be the Iowa legislature's intent in Clark v. Minks. " However,
64. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.9; accord Koback, 366 N.W.2d at 861.

65. POSNER, supra note 56, at 75 (stating that not all losses are preventable

but "through insurance it may be possible to reduce the costs created by the risk
of loss." A preventable loss is where the cost of avoidance is less than the expected

value of the loss).

66. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1227.
67. Cole, 314 N.W.2d at 840 (policy rationale of Ross still valid); Miller v.
Moran 96 Ill.
App. 3d 596, 600, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981); Miller v. OwensIllinois Glass Company, 48 Il1. App. 2d 412, 419, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1964).
68. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Miller, 96 Il1. App.

3d at 600, 421 N.E.2d at 1049 ("legislative rather than judicial question").
69. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 423 (statutory rules are "broad rather than
narrow").

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).

Camille, 30 111.App. 3d at 1052, 334 N.E.2d at 207.
Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 229.
Id.at 229.
Id.at 231.
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the explicit wording of a statute in Minnesota was seen as an indication that the legislature intended to pre-empt previous judicial action
which had imposed liability against social hosts."
The reason for varied legislative results has been attributed to
the high level of transaction costs involved in reaching a general consensus.7" Also, there exists potential for both underinclusion and
overinclusion of potential plaintiffs in the dram shop act. 7
An example of overinclusion would be to establish a standard
of strict liability in the serving of alcohol to an intoxicated person."
Such liability would inhibit society's interest in maintaining social
gatherings which are an intimate part of our free, civilized society. 9
Underinclusion, on the other hand, illustrates the state of the law
before Kelly, where innocent third parties were uncompensated for
losses inflicted by intoxicated guests."
75. Cole, 314 N.W.2d at 840. Earlier case law, in particular, Ross v. Ross,
294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972) held the social host liable under the state's
dram-shop act for "merely provid[ing] liquor gratuitously as an act of hospitality,
if injury occur[ed] to a third person as a result of the illegally supplied recipient."
Minn. Stat. § 4340.73 (1972) stated: "It shall be unlawful for any person
...to sell, give, barter, furnish, deliver, or dispose of . . . [liquor] to any minor,
or any intoxicated person . . . . " In 1977, this statute was amended by removing
the word "giving" which Cole interpreted "to preempt a Civil Damages Act Common law remedy against social hosts."
76. Transaction costs are the costs involved in reaching a consensus and/or
final solution. Examples would be information costs, negotiation costs, inspection
costs, communication costs, and analysis of information costs. These costs rise as
the number of individuals in the decision making group increase. Coase, supra note
56, at 15.
This should not lead the reader to believe that a decision by a small group
will always be better. On the contrary, in a system which places a high value on
individual interests the costs that reflect the possibility of disagreement with the decision
also rise as more members are excluded. Therefore, the efficiency of making the
decision must be balanced with the equity of allowing more individuals to participate
in the choice. See generally J. BUCHANAN & C. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
77. A statute is overinclusive if it imposes liability under circumstances which
discourage activities which add to society's total net welfare-for example, where
the extra benefits to society exceed the added costs to society of allowing the individual to engage in the activity. Underinclusion of a statute is found when a statute
allows socially inefficient activities where the extra benefits allowing individuals to
participate are less than the extra costs. See generally I. Ehrlich & R. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974).
78. Id. at 269 (indicating strict liability would not deter an individual from
engaging in an activity).
79. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1227.
80. Id. at 1229.
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These reasons suggest that social host liability is better formulated
by the judiciary. The court in Kelly recognized that a wide variety
of situations may arise where host liability must be determined. For
example, a large number of guests may serve each other alcohol while
at a third party host's home, or the host may tend to other responsibilities which prevent supervision of the guests." Statutes do not
allow for consideration of these variables. 2 The infinite possibilities
regarding all possible circumstances which may arise suggests that the
decision to serve or not to serve alcohol should therefore be placed
on the person in the best position to evaluate potential risks.83 Since
social hosts are actually present during the activity and are in the
best position to evaluate the benefits and risks of serving additional
alcohol, they are more likely to be in the best position to determine
when to stop serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest. 8 ' In this
manner, the level of due care may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis. 8"
IV.

EVIDENCE OF BREACH: INSURMOUNTABLE

OR OVERLOOKED?

One practical problem in holding a social host liable for the
negligent acts of the intoxicated guest or motorist is determining if
sufficient evidence has been presented to demonstrate that the host
breached his duty.8 6 Proof of intoxication is not an easy task. 7 Two
methods have been offered to prove intoxication: objective and subjective tests. 88
The objective determination places considerable weight on the
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) test.8 9 With the aid of an expert
witness, a court can determine the BAC level at the time of the auto
accident. Furthermore, with an estimate of the BAC level at the time
81. Id. at 1228.

82. POSNER, supra note 56, at 424 (due to transactions costs of including all
possibilities.)

83. One commentator has analyzed the elements that determine whether a

liability rule or a safety regulation should exist in various circumstances. The critical

element in favor of the liability rule was the "possibility of a difference in knowledge

about risky activities . . . " (emphasis original). See Shavell, Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 359 (1984).

84. Id. at 360.

85. Id. See, e.g., Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1228 ("We will face those situations when

and if they come before us.").

86. Comment, Kelley v. Gwinnell: The Social Host and His Visibly Intoxicated
Guests: Joint Liability for Injuries to Third Parties and Proper Evidentiary Tests,

60

NOTRE DAME

L.

REV.

191 (1984).

87. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
88. Id.

89. Comment, supra note 86, at 203.
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the driver left the host's party, the expert is then able to testify to
the expected outward behavior displayed by the intoxicated person.9"
A flaw in this method is that it assumes all people display the same
characteristics at various stages of intoxication."
It has been demonstrated that different people experience and
exhibit different effects from alcohol. 9 Alcohol is absorbed into the
bloodstream and dispersed at varying rates from person to person. 93
In addition, an individual's rate of absorption may vary depending
on time of day, quantity of food consumed, emotional state and other
factors." At best, the BAC should only be utilized as evidence of
intoxication and not as the rule of law." Because of the variable factors
of body weight, time of day and mood, courts are reluctant to adopt
this strict standard. Instead, courts have employed a more subjective
test which balances these factors. 96 Under this approach, the court
looks to the totality of the evidence.9 7 All extrinsic evidence as to
the host's knowledge about the driver's condition is considered.9 8
One fear of imposing liability on social hosts is that a finding
of liability may rest on insufficient evidence. 99 It therefore becomes
essential to establish a practicable method of imposing liability on
the host within the limits of available evidentiary tools.
One method of limiting liability by evidentiary means is to set
the standard of culpability for serving the intoxicated guest at reckless
disregard for therights of others.' 0 This allows the court to analyze
the host's frame of mind in serving drinks,' 0 ' and eliminates a portion of the burden carried by a social host.'0 2 This standard allows
hosts to entertain guests within a higher degree of freedom than a
negligence standard.'0 3 Thus, social welfare is maximized between the
90. Id.at 206.
91. Id.at 207.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 212-213.
96. Ashlock, 475 N.E.2d at 1170; Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 229.
97. See, e.g., Elsperman v. Plump, __ Ind. App.
446 N.E.2d
1027, 1032 (1983).
98. Id.
99. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); POSNER, supra note
56, at 122.
100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(D) (1985).
101. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 4, § 34 at 212.
102. Id.at 214.
103. See generally Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest,
14 J. LAW & EcON. 201 (1971):
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two competing activities: freedom to entertain and compensation for
victims."°4

V.

PROXIMATE CAUSE:
THEORY

To

UTILIZING

A

GAME

DETERMINE LIABILITY

In addition to proof of duty owed and breach, negligence liability
requires the plaintiff to show that a causal connection exists between

the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. ' Specifically, the
injured party must show that the host's conduct in serving liquor to
an intoxicated person has been, in fact, a cause of the injury. ' The
earlier common law view dictated that the drinking of alcohol, not

the serving, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

'

The real challenge is to fashion . . . on the basis of scanty information
... a rule of liability that will maximize the value of the affected activities,
subject to the constraint that any rule chosen be simple enough to be
understood by those subject to the rules and to be applied by courts ....
Id. at 221.
104. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1224 (importance of social gathering values 6utweighed
by importance of deterrence). An alternative protection against over extending liability
is to increase the burden of proof from a preponderance of the evidence standard
to one of clear and convincing evidence. The preponderance of the evidence standard is met where the chances of the plaintiff being correct are "by a probability
infinitesimally greater than 50 percent." POSNER, supra note 56, at 432. Clear and
convincing evidence, on the other hand is:
That measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of
the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought;
it is intermediate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent
of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal

cases.
Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas 215 Va. 535, -, 211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (quoting
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118, 123 (1954)). See generally

POSNER, supra note 56, at 432. In deciding whether the benefits in engaging in an
activity exceed the costs, the actor is forced, by his duty to another, to take into
consideration the external social costs imposed on others. The costs that are evaluated
by the social hosts may include, but are not limited to, the potential medical expenses
and property damage inflicted on injured third parties, cost of litigation, lost wages
for time in court and lost interest that could have been earned on the money spent
to compensate. These costs, however, are discounted by probability of being found
liable. At a higher burden of proof, the probability of being determined at fault
is smaller and thus the expected social costs are less.
105. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 4, § 42 at 272-73.
106. See e.g., Walker, 686 P.2d at 977 ("It is well settled that intervening acts
of the driver will not relieve liability if those acts are reasonably foreseeable.")
(emphasis original).
107. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; But see Koback, 366 N.W.2d
at 865 (host serving a minor liable if proven to be a substantial factor in causing
the injury).
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Determining the scope of liability is ultimately based on a question of social policy: whether the benefits protecting the plaintiff's

interest outweigh the costs of prevention.' 8 Also, courts must take
into consideration the administrative costs of imposing such liability. '
Limiting liability to a breach of the standard of care only under

certain conditions is one way to determine if a causal connection

exists." 0 The defendant will be found liable depending upon whether
his conduct is appropriate under the circumstances.'' The scope of
liability is the sum total of the conditions under which liability may
be imposed." 2 The object is to include only those conditions which
induce the defendant to exercise due care. ' 3 For example, under a
108. Landes and Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 4,
§ 43, at 287 ("The real problem, and one to which attention should be directed,
would seem to be one of social policy: whether the defendants should bear the heavy
negligence losses of a complex civilization, rather than the individual plaintiff.").
109. Shavel, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law
of Torts, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 463, 465 (1980) See, e.g., Miller, 48 II1. App. 2d at 423,
199 N.E.2d at 306 ("If such was the law, a social drink with your neighbor or friend
would be a hazardous act. It would open the floodgates of litigation as to almost
every happening where someone was injured.").
l10. Shavel, supra note Ill, at 476 n.34.
This approach utilizes a mathematician's decision process called game theory.
The decision maker, in this case being the social host, is faced with several alternative choices. For example, to serve liquor without care, with care, or not at all.
The decision as to which activity will be undertaken rests upon the evaluation of
the payoffs or losses under various conditions commonly called "states of the world".
A simple example would be consideration of the expected traffic guests will face
when they leave the host's home, such as heavy, moderate, or light. The host takes
into consideration the probability of the existence of such condition. The choice of
activity is determined by the net expected welfare (or utility) that the host will receive.
Since the losses and payoffs are different under each condition, a court can influence
the net expected welfare by eliminating or including various conditions under which
liability will be imposed.
This example is limited to two dimensions for purposes of illustration. Once
the basic concept is understood, however, the theory may be expanded into infinite
dimensions. The casual connection is achieved by looking at the defendant decision
maker's choice of conduct in relation to all the conditions which actually existed
at the time of the injury, such as traffic, weather, road conditions, time of day,
etc. For a mathematical discussion of this theory, See R. WINKLER, INTRODUCTION
J. LEG. STUD. 109 at 110-11 (1983);

TO BAYESIAN INFERENCE AND DECISION,

ch. 5 (1972); F.

HILLIER AND

G.

LIEBERMAN,

ch. 8 (1980).
Ill. See Shavel, supra note Ill, at 476.
112. Id.
113. Id.This approach avoids the imposition of crushing liability-liability so
extensive it destroys all incentives to partake in the activity. In this case, the social
host weighs the costs and benefits of serving additional drinks. Since the expected
INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
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theory of strict liability, the defendant would be liable regardless of
whether due care is utilized. Since liability exists without fault, he
has no incentive to participate in the activity." 4 On the other end
of the spectrum, if no liability exists, no incentive exists to expend
resources to conform to the standard of care since liability will never
be incurred.'' 5
In the social host context, strict liability and no liability are unacceptable alternatives since neither maximizes society's welfare. Furthermore, the administrative costs of enforcing liability increase as
the scope of liability expands.' 6 The more conditions under which
liability may be found, the more cases are taken to court, and the
attendant problems and costs of increased litigation follow. For example, strict liability maximizes administrative costs since all conditions are included." 7 Optimally, the factors must be balanced: the
benefit of injured party's interest in compensation weighed against
the added expense to the host (for insurance or out-of-pocket payment), the impairment of society's interest in social gatherings, and
the burden on the court's caseload." '
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

The extent to which social host liability will be imposed is dependent upon various fact situations. New Jersey courts have had occasion to follow and limit the impact of Kelly." 9 A key element of
the Kelly decision was that the host served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest knowing that the guest was about to drive a vehicle. The
deterrence of drunk driving was one of the objectives of the decision
in Kelly. Liability, however, may be imposed under other circumstances
which do not include driving, such as fighting between intoxicated
costs of liability rise as the number of various conditions included increase (while
the level of benefits remains constant) he will choose to serve fewer and fewer drinks.
114. Id. This is not the socially optimal level since it is assumed society derives
extensive benefits from engaging in drinking with others.
115. Id.at 481.

116. Id.at 465. As additional suits are filed in court, the time and resources
expended by attorneys, judges and the parties to resolve the dispute increases.
117. Id.at 479-80. The court must deal with all injuries.
118. Id. at 484. ("The social-welfare-maximizing scope of liability appropriately
balances the advantages and disadvantages.").

119. In 1984, the Supreme Court of New Jersey interpreted Kelly to mean that
liability for serving an intoxicated adult or minor did not depend on "the nature
or character of the supplier of the alcoholic beverage" but rather on traditional
negligence analysis. Davis v. Sam Goody, Inc. 195 N.J. Super. 423, ...480 A.2d
212, 213 (1984).
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guests, ' 0 or an injury resulting from an airplane crash.' 2 ' A difficult
issue is whether liability is to be imposed when the social host's guest
is not driving, yet injures a third party. The scope of the social host's
liability arguably should be no greater than the liability of the commercial vendor. The policy considerations that limit the scope of
liability of the dram shop to the intoxicated patron's automobile
accidents should apply to social hosts.
It is possible that legislatures will impose liability by statute before
courts extend it by decision. However, as the continuing social impact of drunk driving emerges through the efforts of such organizations as Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD"), Remove intoxicated Motorists ("RID"), and Students Against Driving Drunk
("SADD"), strong lobbying efforts by such groups may persuade the
legislatures to take quick action against reckless social hosts.
Social host liability may also prove to be a boon to the insurance
industry. As a justification to raise homeowner premiums, and as a
new market for potential short-term policies for gatherings such as
wedding receptions or office Christmas parties, insurance companies
may realize an accelerated increase in revenues. If the total payments
on claims are less than the earned yield from investing the additional
premium revenue, the industry will certainly support the imposition
of liability. The only real obstacle to this occurrence would be if social
hosts decide to be risk-takers and decline to purchase insurance. This
is an unlikely result, however, if the price of the additional insurance
coverage is within reach of the majority of the potential purchasers.' 22
However, in 1985 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to impose liability
on the grandparents of two children injured, one fatally, in a fire caused by their
intoxicated mother. She was served two drinks at the grandparents home and, upon
returning to her own house, left a smoldering cigarette on the sofa, which ignited
after the household was asleep. The court stated that to impose liability on the grandparents would be "beyond the boundary of that which might justly be deemed a
foreseeably probable consequence of their [the grandparents] conduct." Griesenbeck
by Kuttner v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132,
-, 488 A.2d 1038, 1043 (1985).
120. Such actions have already existed under dram shop acts. See Halka v. Zupan,
68 III. App. 3d 616, 386 N.E.2d 439 (1979) (plaintiff hit over the head with pool
cue by an intoxicated patron); Kowalczuk v. Rotter, 63 Wis.2d 511, 317 N.W.2d
332 (1974) (plaintiff attacked by other patrons, then dragged outside and robbed).
121. See Buckley v. Pirolo Estate, 190 N.J. Super. 491, 464 A.2d 1136 (1983)
(allowing a dram shop to assert the defense of contributory negligence against the
claims of the passengers who flew in a twin engine plane with an intoxicated pilot).
122. Consumers tend to be risk adverse. Risk aversion has its roots in the value
consumers place on their dollars earned as income. The last dollar earned by the
consumer is less valuable to him than the first since he already possesses a number
of dollars. He therefore has an incentive to use the last few dollars he earns to
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Whether insurance is purchased is irrelevant if the object of imposing
liability on social hosts for the negligent acts of intoxicated guests
is to force the host to fully realize the costs of additional drinks.
The host will have the choice of paying these costs through liquidating
assets or by paying the premiums.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The imposition of social host liability for the negligent acts of
an intoxicated guest is intended to prevent injured victims from being
uncompensated by those who inflicted the harm, and to deter the
consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol and thereby to reduce
the number of drunk drivers. The focal point of the issue, in most
states, has extended beyond the traditional common law concept that
the drinking of alcohol, not the serving, is the proximate cause of
the injury. The issue has now turned to whether the courts or state
legislatures should impose liability. Following the lead of New Jersey,
Indiana and Iowa now impose liability on a host who serves visibly
intoxicated adults, while Georgia, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin impose liability for serving a minor. Presumably other states
will follow in imposing liability. Also, as the role of insurance coverage
of the host becomes clearly defined, a finding of liability is more
likely. Thus, hosts will have to consider the potential costs of liability
when serving additional liquor to guests.' 2 3
CHARLES

G. Popp

protect the already acquired income by purchasing insurance. Economists refer to
this concept as diminishing marginal utility of money income. See generally POSNER,
supra note 56, at 75.
123. It is interesting to note that the bar to social host liability was originally
stated in Illinois in Cruse v. Aden 127 111. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889), a time when

the automobile was just being invented.

